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1
INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 1
Amici are professors and scholars of the law of
nonprofit organizations. 2 Collectively, they have
served as officials in all aspects of the administration
of nonprofit law, including as head of the Charities
Bureau in a state Attorney General’s office, Chief
Counsel to a state Attorney General’s office, and a
member of the IRS Advisory Committee on Tax
Exempt and Governmental Entities, and as
administrators of federal tax law pertaining to
charities at the Joint Committee on Taxation, U.S.
Department of Treasury, the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”), and U.S. Department of Justice. They have
founded research projects on charities regulation and
oversight at think tanks and law schools, and they
assist state Attorney General offices in studying and
adopting new approaches to the regulation of charity
and charitable solicitation.
No party in this case represents all three of
charity’s key stakeholders: charities, states, and
taxpayers who underwrite the charities’ funding.
Amici are participating in this litigation in order to aid
the Court in understanding how these three interests
depend on one another. They also attempt to provide a
clearer understanding of state supervision of charities
and how that supervision relates to federal tax law.
1
Counsel for all parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
Pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 37.6, amici affirm that no
counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and
that no person or entity other than amici curiae or their counsel
made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation
or submission of this brief.
2
Amici are listed, with brief biographies, in the Appendix to this
brief.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
California has a compelling interest in sustaining
its charitable sector, the nation’s largest. Petitioners
challenge the State’s requirement that tax-exempt
charities provide to the California Attorney General,
on a confidential basis, a copy of the IRS Form 990
Schedule B form that charities file annually with the
Internal Revenue Service. Their challenge, if upheld,
would undercut crucial and irreplaceable elements of
California’s efforts to regulate its charitable sector and
ensure public confidence in charities operating in the
State. More than that, Petitioners’ same arguments
could apply equally to central aspects of the federal
regulation of charities and other major components of
state supervision. Thus, whatever the applicable level
of constitutional scrutiny, California’s collection of
information about major charitable donors should
survive review.
Since before the founding of this nation, Attorneys
General have worked to build and preserve charity. A
gift to charity is fundamentally a matter of trust: trust
that money placed in the hands of another, over whom
the donor has few direct means of control, will go to its
promised
good
purposes.
Attorney
General
supervision supplies a strong basis for that trust, by
ensuring that assets donated for charitable purposes
are in fact used for those purposes.
Attorney General supervision is necessary not only
to prevent the fraud and deception that Petitioners
emphasize. It is necessary also to protect the public’s
interest against the potentially contrary private
interests of an organization’s major donors, officers,
and other “insiders” who may be in a position to make
use of a charity’s resources for their own purposes
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rather than for the charitable ends the state and the
charity’s other donors hope to foster.
Seen in this light, California’s compelling interest
in learning, on a confidential basis, the identities of an
organization’s major donors—and that is all that
Schedule B reveals, not “membership lists”—is
evident. No legal regime can protect effectively against
opportunistic behavior by insiders without being able
to identify who those insiders are.
By focusing narrowly on whether Schedule B was
essential to particular investigations, Petitioners
divert the Court’s attention from larger and more
important systemic uses for major-donor information.
For one, uniform reporting of such information, in a
machine-readable format and in advance of any
potential investigation for wrongdoing, streamlines
and reduces the cost of supervising California’s
115,000 charities and eliminates the need to initiate
some
costly
and
potentially
burdensome
investigations. California has approximately one
attorney available for oversight of each 5,000 to 10,000
charities. To even identify which transactions require
more than minimal scrutiny, the state must first be
able to see basic identifying and financial information
and to match these items against each other for red
flags. Schedule B makes this process efficient without
imposing any additional administrative burden on
charities.
Information reporting also plays a major role in
deterrence, as ample evidence has shown in many tax
contexts. It is more difficult for a major donor to induce
a charity to, for example, hire its donor as a contractor
at supra-competitive prices, if the charity knows that
both the donation and the contract will be reported to
the State (on Schedule B and elsewhere on the
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charity’s federal tax return) and readily visible to the
organization’s own compliance personnel. Petitioners’
focus on the number of individual investigations
ignores this important function of the reporting
requirements. Indeed, to the extent that deterrence is
effective, one would expect to see fewer individual
investigations based on Schedule B, because there are
fewer actual instances of abuse.
Petitioners’ suggestion that individual State
requests for donor information should suffice is
misguided. In addition to failing to serve this crucial
deterrence purpose, such requests would often be more
burdensome to donors than Schedule B itself.
Investigations consume time and resources and may
generate negative publicity that could impact other
donations, often the life blood of these charities. All of
these effects could in many instances be avoided if
Schedule B information were available and
exculpatory. In those situations where there is real
wrongdoing, that wrongdoing could continue in the
absence of Schedule B reporting, perhaps aided by
spoliation of requested evidence, as investigative
demands wend their way through courts.
Finally, if Petitioners’ view of the major-donor
reporting rule—taking it in isolation while ignoring its
deterrent effects—were applied to many other
components of charitable supervision by states and the
IRS, they too might fall. Many charities must publicly
report Schedule B information. Other publicly
available data reported annually to California and the
IRS similarly reveal personal information about a
charity’s closest supporters, such as board members,
key employees, contractors, and certain grantees. Like
major-donor information, this information may not,
standing alone, be directly useful to supervisory
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authorities but instead becomes meaningful when
used in combination with other reported information.
If requiring the provision of Schedule B to the State
Attorney General on a confidential basis were
unconstitutional because, in very rare instances, its
accidental disclosure might deter association with a
charity, these other forms of reporting might also be
deemed constitutionally suspect.
ARGUMENT
I.

California Has A Compelling Interest In
Information About Substantial Donors

Whatever the level of scrutiny applicable to
California’s request for major-donor information, that
request survives constitutional challenge because
California’s interests would meet even the most
demanding standard. California has compelling
interests in preserving charitable assets held in trust
for public use and in upholding public confidence in
California charities, which are among the largest and
most trusted in the country. The Attorney General’s
access to information about major organizational
supporters is essential to the Attorney General’s
efforts to safeguard charitable assets and maintain the
public’s trust in the charitable sector.
A.

California’s Interest in Supervising
Charities and Charitable Solicitation

A state Attorney General’s power to supervise
charitable organizations is deeply enshrined in the
fabric of American law, with roots older than this
country. Even before the English Statute of Charitable
Uses in 1601, the Attorney General (of the Crown) had
the power to bring suit to enforce a charitable trust.
Marion
Fremont-Smith,
Governing
Nonprofit
Organizations 27, 32-34 (2004); Restatement of the
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Law, Charitable Nonprofit Organizations § 5.01(a), (c)
(Am. L. Inst., 2021); Robert Carlson & Caitlin Calder,
Protection and Regulation of Nonprofits and
Charitable Assets, in State Attorneys General Powers
and Responsibilities, Nat’l Ass’n of Att’ys Gen. 215216 (Emily Myers ed., 2018). This common law power
eventually provided the basis for the power of the
Attorneys General of the various states. Governing
Nonprofit Organizations at 305-14, 324.
States grant Attorneys General power to regulate
charity to ensure that charitable assets are preserved
irrevocably for public benefit. “The state attorney
general . . . has the authority to protect charitable
assets and interests within the jurisdiction of the state
. . . .” Restatement of the Law, Charitable Nonprofit
Organizations § 5.01; see Cal. Gov’t Code § 12598(a). 3
“[A]ll the assets of a corporation organized solely for
charitable purposes must be deemed to be impressed
with a charitable trust by virtue of the express
declaration of the corporation’s purposes . . . [S]aid
property [is] therefore ‘irrevocably dedicated’ to
exempt purposes . . . .” Pacific Home v. County of Los
The regulatory framework for charities oversight in the United
States is complex, with state Attorneys General and federal
officials including the IRS, Department of Treasury, Federal
Trade Commission, and even the United States Postal Office
constituting a regulatory ecosystem. Each of these offices or
agencies has its own jurisdiction, some of which is concurrent
with other offices, some of which stands alone. This “interlocking
jurisdiction” affords states the primary role in overseeing
governance, trusts, solicitation, charities registration compliance
and corporate transactions, both through civil and criminal
jurisdiction. Protection and Regulation of Nonprofits and
Charitable Assets, 216-218; Cindy M. Lott & Marion FremontSmith, State Regulatory and Legal Framework, in Nonprofits and
Government: Collaboration and Conflict 164 (Elizabeth T. Boris
& C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2016).
3
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Angeles, 41 Cal. 2d 844, 852 (1953). As described in a
leading casebook on nonprofit organizations:
The attorney general represents the
public in enforcing the purposes of the
trust or corporation. The common law
duties of the attorney general reflected
the expectations of society: that there
should be a single evolving duty to carry
out the charitable purposes of the trust,
that it was necessary to keep trust
property productive, and that trustees
should be prohibited from diverting
charitable funds for improper purposes
or self-dealing.
James J. Fishman et al., Nonprofit Organizations:
Cases and Materials 204 (5th ed. 2015).
To preserve the public’s interest in charitable
property and its uses, state laws grant Attorneys
General power not only to investigate and gather
information about charities in their jurisdiction, but
also—unlike the authority of the IRS under federal
law—to exercise broad regulatory and enforcement
authority over charitable solicitations. Protection and
Regulation of Nonprofits and Charitable Assets, at
229. An Attorney General may require an accounting
of an organization’s assets and may “investigate
transactions and relationships of directors and
trustees to determine whether property held or used
by them has been allocated to charitable purposes.”
Nonprofit Organizations at 204-05. Moreover,
Attorneys
General
may
enjoin
or
impose
restitutionary duties on an organization’s officers and
managers. Id. They may remove directors or trustees
chosen by the organization and, in extreme cases, even
wholly dissolve the entity and distribute its assets to
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other charitable uses. Id. All of these common-law and
statutory powers and tools are wielded, however, by a
small cohort of state charities regulators who, as of
2013, numbered fewer than 400 state attorney-general
staffers overseeing more than one million nonprofits
in the United States. Cindy M. Lott et al., State
Regulation and Enforcement in the Charitable Sector
8 (2016); Elizabeth T. Boris & Cindy M. Lott,
Reflections on Challenged Regulators, in Regulating
Charities: The Inside Story 104 (Myles McGreggorLowndes and Bob Wyatt eds., 2017).
Most enforcement authority rests uniquely with
Attorneys General. “In most states only the attorney
general has the power and standing to intervene and
investigate misappropriations of charitable funds,
breaches of fiduciary duty and self-dealing by
directors, and fraud in charitable solicitations.”
Protection and Regulation of Nonprofits and
Charitable Assets, at 215. “Since there is usually no
one willing to assume the burdens of a legal action, or
who could properly represent the interests of the trust
or the public, the Attorney General has been
empowered to oversee charities as the representative
of the public.” Holt v. College of Osteopathic Physicians
& Surgeons, 61 Cal. 2d 750, 754 (1964). If the Attorney
General fails to enforce the law, no one else will.
Attorney General oversight works to ensure donor
trust. Better Business Bureau Wise Giving Alliance
Donor Trust Report 2020, 10 (2020) https://www.
give.org/docs/default-source/donor-trust-library/2020donor-trust-report.pdf. Many donors would not
support charitable endeavors if they believed that the
organization’s insiders, including major donors, would
profit from their contribution or otherwise divert
charitable assets for the insiders’ own private
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purposes. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. 652, 675 n.6 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(citing Henry Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit
Enterprise, 89 Yale L.J. 835, 843-845 (1980)). States
with stronger reporting requirements experience less
self-dealing. Mihir A. Desai & Robert J. Yetman,
Constraining Managers without Owners: Governance
of the Not-for-Profit Enterprise, 4 J. Governmental &
Nonprofit Accounting 53, 69 (2015). Donors give more
to charities in states with greater protections against
managerial self-dealing. Fisman & Hubbard,
Precautionary Savings and the Governance of
Nonprofit Organizations, 89 J. Pub. Econ. 2231, 224041 (2005). And fraud or improper dealing by one
charity can negatively affect the reputation of many
others. Mark S. LeClair, Reported Instances of
Nonprofit Corruption: Do Donors Respond to Scandals
in the Charitable Sector?, 22 Corp. Reputation Rev. 39
(2019); Joanne G. Carman, What You Don’t Know Can
Hurt Your Community: Lessons from a Local United
Way, 21 Nonprofit Management and Leadership 433
(2011).
Accordingly, the States uniformly prohibit selfdealing transactions between a charity and certain of
its insiders. Governing Nonprofit Organizations, at
217. A charity may not distribute profits to these
insiders, such as by paying them excessive
compensation or by entering into sweetheart deals for
the charity’s use of the insider’s property. Id.
Charitable assets of the organization may not be used
for the private benefit of insiders, except to the extent
that such use is merely incidental to some publicregarding charitable purpose. In re Los Angeles
County Pioneer Soc’y, 40 Cal. 2d 852, 860 (1953). Thus,
a charity may not be used as means of generating
business for its major donors or other insiders. See
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Complaint at 8, 9, 13, People v. L.B. Research & Educ.
Found., No. BC 421250 (L.A. Super. Ct., filed Sept. 8,
2009),
https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/
press_releases/n1799_lbresearch.pdf (alleging donations-for-business scheme); AFPF JA 415.
Attorney General oversight of charitable
solicitation serves ends similar to those of donor and
contractor oversight. As with investors in securities, a
charity’s financial supporters “would hesitate to
venture their capital in a market . . . unchecked by
law.” United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658
(1997). Regulation to prevent fraudulent or misleading
solicitation thus preserves funders’ confidence and,
with that, the stream of funding itself. Id. “Attorney
general action is imperative to protect consumers,
uphold the reputation of the charitable sector, and
encourage the continued generosity of the public.”
Protection and Regulation of Nonprofits and
Charitable Assets at 229; see Restatement of the Law,
Charitable Nonprofit Organizations § 5.01 cmt. d.
California enjoys one of the nation’s largest and
most widely supported charitable sectors. As of June
2018, charities registered in California reported $295
billion in annual income and net assets of $851 billion.
Cal. Dep’t of Justice, Attorney General’s Guide for
Charities 1 (2020). At about that time, charities
nationwide held about $3.8 trillion in assets,
indicating that California registrants represent about
22.4% of the charitable assets in the entire nation.
Urban Institute, National Center for Charitable
Statistics, The Nonprofit Sector in Brief 2019 (June
2020),
https://nccs.urban.org/publication/nonprofitsector-brief-2019#the-nonprofit-sector-in-brief-2019.
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Its charitable sector is nearly three times as large, on
a per-capita basis, as amicus Arizona. 4
California has a compelling interest in preserving
the integrity and vibrancy of its charitable sector,
safeguarding assets already under charitable control,
and encouraging further contributions. Other states
may prefer a light-touch strategy in which regulatory
burdens, and perhaps donor trust, are lower.
Compare, e.g., Cal. Gov’t Code § 12581 (requiring
registration of “all charitable corporations . . . over
which the state . . . has enforcement or supervisory
powers”), with Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-3722
(requiring state registration only for charities
soliciting funds for veterans organizations). 5 Each
state has a compelling interest in developing its own
vision of how best to support and regulate private
charity, and different states have made different
choices. See Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing
Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 623 (2003).

California’s population of 39.5 million, U.S. Census, Quick Facts
California (July 1, 2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/CA,
is just 12% of the nation’s 328.2 million, U.S. Census, Quick Facts
United States (July 1, 2019), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/
fact/table/US/PST045219. In contrast, Arizona nonprofits held
just $48 billion in assets, or 1.3% of the national total.
Independent Sector, State Profile – Arizona (Mar. 18, 2020),
https://independentsector.org/resource/state-profile-arizona/.
Arizona’s population of 6.4 million is 2% of the national total. U.S.
Census,
Quick
Facts
Arizona
(July
1,
2019),
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/AZ.
5
A comprehensive summary of state enforcement policies is
available at The Legal Compendium, Urban Inst. (Oct. 29, 2019),
https://www.urban.org/policy-centers/center-nonprofits-andphilanthropy/projects/regulation-charitable-sector-project (click
link to “Download the Legal Compendium” to download the
spreadsheet).
4
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B.

Information About Substantial Donors
Is an Integral Part of Charities
Supervision

Contrary to repeated suggestions from Petitioners,
this is a case about confidential reporting of
information to government officials, not about any
broader disclosure to the public. Federal law already
obliges charitable organizations to share detailed
information about their finances, organizational
structure, and activities with the public. 26 U.S.C. §
6104(d)(1). But, even when reported to government,
information about most charities’ donors is
confidential, 26 U.S.C. § 6104(d)(3)(A), and a
government official who willfully reveals such
confidential information outside certain statutorily
authorized circumstances has committed a federal
crime, 26 U.S.C. §§ 6103, 7213. The reporting
obligation challenged here should stand or fall based
on whether confidentially reporting donor information
to government regulators serves a sufficiently
important governmental purpose. 6
A legal regime intended to guard against
opportunistic behavior by insiders cannot function
unless regulators can identify the insiders. Major
donors, no less than other insiders, may be able to
divert resources from charitable goals to their own
uses. Identifying and policing transactions with major
donors thus serves an important role in preserving
Making such data available to potential supporters increases
donor support by allowing donors to distinguish high-performing
charities from their competitors. Putnam Barber et al., Does
Mandatory Disclosure Matter? The Case of Nonprofit
Fundraising, 50 Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Q. __ (forthcoming
2021). Thus, certain public disclosures about charities that do
occur may actually increase, not discourage, donations.

6
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public confidence in the charitable sector. George G.
Triantis, Organizations as Internal Capital Markets:
The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts
in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises, 117 Harv.
L. Rev. 1102, 1147-48 (2004) (noting that crossmonitoring of other donors is important to charitable
contributors but difficult for them to accomplish on
their own).
Indeed, federal law recognizes that large
contributors to an organization are often in a position
to exert control over the operations of the donee
charity. Federal law, like that of California and other
states, restricts certain transactions between insiders
and the charity. 26 U.S.C. § 4958. For these purposes,
federal law defines insiders to include “substantial
contributors.” 26 U.S.C. §§ 507(d)(2)(A), 4958(c)(3)(C);
26 C.F.R. § 53.4958-3(e)(2)(ii). A substantial
contributor is “any person who contributed . . . an
aggregate amount of more than $5,000 . . . if such
amount is more than 2 percent of the total
contributions . . . received” for the year. 26 U.S.C. §
507(d)(2)(A).
IRS reporting requirements are designed to ensure
that the Service can enforce these limitations. Not
coincidentally, the donors an organization must report
on Schedule B of its tax return are exactly those who
would qualify as substantial contributors. See Internal
Revenue Service, Form 990 Schedule B Instructions
for 2020.
Petitioners argue that donor information is
unnecessary to uncover fraud. Foundation Br. 1, 8, 31.
Even if that were true (and it is not), it would neglect
the fact that Attorney General oversight guards not
only against fraud but also against insider self-dealing
more generally. A major donor can influence board
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decisions about vendors, grantees, expenditures, and
sale or lease of charitable assets—all decisions that
can result in a benefit flowing back to the donor or the
donor’s family. Organizations already report key
employees, grantees, and major contractors. Internal
Revenue Service, Form 990. Without major-donor
information, there would be no indication in the
organization’s filings to show when grants or contracts
are awarded to influential donors. Has the
organization, for example, hired a key employee who
happens to be its main supporter’s underqualified
child? Without donor information, a regulator cannot
easily know.
Petitioners make much of the supposed fact that
California points to relatively few reported instances
in which substantial-contributor information was
central to a fraud investigation, but Petitioners
apparently fail to understand basic features of how
deterrence works. Unfortunately, attempted fraud
within and by ostensible charities is not rare. E.g.,
Kris Hundley & Kendall Taggart, America’s 50 Worst
Charities Rake in Nearly $1 Billion for Corporate
Fundraisers, Tampa Bay Times (Oct. 2, 2017); see
Janet Greenlee et al., An Investigation of Fraud in
Nonprofit Organizations: Occurrences and Deterrents,
36 Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Q. 676, 677 (2007)
(noting more than 2,000 fraudulent Internet sites
soliciting donations for Katrina relief); Deborah S.
Archambeault et al., Fraud and Corruption in U.S.
Nonprofit Entities: A Summary of Press Reports 20082011, 44 Nonprofit & Voluntary Sector Q. 1194, 1215
(2015) (“[N]onprofit fraud continues to be a significant
and costly issue.”). Even if it were true that the
number of litigated fraud cases involving donor
information were small, that would be fully consistent
with the importance of major-donor reporting,
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because, as discussed further below, that reporting
itself helps prevent fraud. In essence, Petitioners
argue that, since houses with large guard dogs are
never robbed, guard dogs must be unnecessary. The
scarcity of observed instances of fraud in states with
more modest enforcement regimes also does not shed
light on the efficacy of California’s regime, because
those states may, in the absence of major-donor
disclosure, fail to detect many fraud cases.
Lastly, Petitioners seem to suggest that IRS
requirements are not relevant to whether California
needs major-donor information, because the Attorney
General does not directly dispense tax benefits.
Foundation Br. 45-46; Law Center Br. 54. States share
with federal tax law, however, the common goal of
protecting charitable resources from diversion to
private purposes. Staff of Joint Comm. on Internal
Revenue Taxation, 91st Cong., General Explanation of
the Tax Reform Act of 1969 52-53 (Comm. Print Dec.
3, 1970). In any event, if a nonprofit breaches or loses
its federal tax-exempt status, that may directly impact
that nonprofit’s status under state law as well. E.g.,
Cal. Corp. Code § 5260. States have their own discrete
interest in substantiating federal tax-exempt status as
well as adherence to their own state laws. Thus, the
Internal Revenue Code requires the Treasury
Department to notify “the appropriate State officer,”
which includes the state Attorney General, when the
IRS refuses to recognize the charitable status of an
organization, revokes a charity’s tax exemption, or
imposes certain taxes on a charity. 26 U.S.C. §
6104(c)(1).
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C.

Schedule B Is Narrowly Tailored to
Obtain Information Necessary to
Charities Supervision

In an apparent effort to liken this case to prior
cases involving membership lists, Petitioners
repeatedly and inaccurately describe Schedule B as a
“sweeping” or “blanket” demand for donor information.
Foundation Br. 2, 8, 19; Law Center Br. 25, 33, 35. To
the contrary, Schedule B requires reporting only of
those donors who are in a position to exert influence
comparable to other insiders. More specifically, the
Schedule B obliges nonprofits such as Petitioners to
provide, on a confidential non-public basis, identifying
information for donors that give the greater of $5,000
or 2 percent of the organization’s support for the year.
An organization with $1 billion in annual
contributions would report only donors who had given
$20 million dollars or more.
Thus, in practice, Schedule B’s disjunctive test
limits donor reporting to a select group of large donors.
As applied to Petitioner Americans for Prosperity
Foundation, the two-percent rule means that, for
2014, only donors who gave more than about $429,000
would have to be reported. For 2018, the threshold was
approximately $340,000. Internal Revenue Service,
Form 990: Return of Organization Exempt from
Income Tax: Americans for Prosperity Foundation
(2018), available at https://projects.propublica.org/
nonprofits/display_990/521527294/
02_2020_prefixes_47-52%2F521527294_201812_990_
2020021417150111. For Petitioner Thomas More, the
two-percent disclosure thresholds in those respective
years were approximately $35,650 and $31,700.
Internal Revenue Service, Form 990: Return of
Organization Exempt from Income Tax: Thomas More
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Law Center (2018), available at https://projects.
propublica.org/nonprofits/display_990/383448297/06_
2019_prefixes_35-39%2F383448297_201812_990_
2019061316407569.
Requiring donors of such substantial sums to be
confidentially reported to government regulators is
hardly a “dragnet” capturing small donors or all
members. Of course, whether any particular
contribution is “major” or “substantial” is a relative
question, and the major-donor thresholds therefore
depend on organization size: the less an organization
raises, the lower the contribution thresholds for
substantial contributors. Far from being a blanket
demand for an organization’s donors or members, the
Schedule B is carefully tailored to capture only those
donors who are particularly relevant to charitable
oversight: those who, by virtue of their substantial
support for the organization, are in a position to
influence or take advantage of the organization’s
affairs.
Accordingly, California’s requirement is a far cry
from the sort of demand for membership lists that was
at issue in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357
U.S. 449 (1958); Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963); and the
other cases cited by Petitioners. Donors making
contributions of thousands of dollars a year are not the
“rank-and-file members” with which the Court was
concerned in NAACP. 357 U.S. at 464. They are
instead more closely akin to persons who “hold official
positions” with the organization, the identities of
which were not at issue in that case. Id.
Petitioners do briefly acknowledge that California’s
reporting requires information on only a narrow slice
of donors; but, rather than admitting that this fact
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takes their case outside the ambit of NAACP, they try
to spin it to their advantage by arguing that the
reporting obligation is too limited to be useful.
Foundation Br. 47. But the reason California requires
reporting only of those major donors listed in Schedule
B is precisely because it is the identity of these
donors—those tending to have “substantial influence
over the affairs of an organization,” 26 C.F.R. §
53.4958-3(e)(2)(ii)—that is most relevant to charitable
enforcement. As discussed above, California has a
longstanding duty to protect charitable assets, and the
identity of substantial contributors in particular is
directly related to enforcing that duty.
Historical context also suggests the relatively
modest scope of California’s donor reporting. The
origins of the Schedule B requirement are 80 years old.
In 1941, the very first version of the informational
return for charities (now known as the Form 990)
required an itemized list of contributions exceeding
$4,000. Cheryl Chasin et al., Form 990, Internal
Revenue Service, 2002 Exempt Organizations
Continuing Professional Education Materials 227,
available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/eotop
icg02.pdf. In 1947, in the next version of the form,
filers were required to provide “a list of large
contributors” with a lower reporting threshold of
$3,000. Id. at 228
Reporting requirements expanded in 1969. Before
that year, most of the tax-exempt sector did not have
to file an annual return. Concerns about self-dealing
and other abuses led to a general requirement that
“every exempt organization must file an annual
information return” (with exceptions for churches,
certain religious orders, and very small organizations).
General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 at
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53. As explained by the Congressional Joint
Committee on Taxation at the time: “The Congress
concluded that experience of the past two decades
indicated that more information is needed on a more
current basis from more organizations and that this
information should be made more readily available to
the public, including State officials.” General
Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 at 52-53
(emphasis added).
In 1969, Congress expanded both the universe of
mandatory filers and the information required on the
form:
[Required] to be shown on each
information return [are] the names and
addresses of all substantial contributors,
directors,
trustees,
and
other
management officials and of highly
compensated employees. Compensation
and other payments to managers and
highly compensated employees also must
be shown. All this information is to be
available to the public, except for the
names and addresses of substantial
contributors to exempt organizations
other than private foundations. (The
non-private foundations, are, however,
required to disclose those names to the
Internal Revenue Service.)
General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of 1969 at
53.
The 1969 Act also requires disclosure of highly
detailed information about charitable organizations,
their beneficiaries, and those who work with them.
Organizations must report the names, hours worked,
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and in many cases compensation of board members,
officers, and other key employees. Form 990 passim.
Grant recipients are identified by name and taxpayer
i.d. number, the amount of grant received, and the
purposes of the grant. Internal Revenue Service, Form
990 Schedule I Instructions (2020). All this reported
information is freely available to the public. 26 U.S.C.
§ 6104(d)(3)(A). If association with a reporting charity
bears some public opprobrium, it may fall on all these
publicly named persons and entities as readily as on
donors, and it is more likely to do so where, in contrast
to the confidential reporting of donors at issue here,
the information is public.
The public nature of so much charitable
information also undermines Petitioners’ claim that
California’s reporting requirement threatens their
associational freedoms. The claim is specious. As
Petitioner APF acknowledges, Foundation Br. 50-51,
whether or not its donations from private foundations
appear on its Schedule B, private foundations are
themselves required by federal law to publicly disclose
their grants. 26 U.S.C. § 6104(d)(1), (3)(A). Any
harassment is far more likely the result of such public
disclosure by the grantor private foundation.
The information reported to California on Schedule
B is very modest when viewed in the context of
charitable disclosures more generally. As a sovereign
State, California could have developed its own
information-reporting regime, its own definition of
“substantial contributor,” and its own form. Instead,
California opted to rely on long-established forms and
reporting rules already familiar to charities and their
supporters, thereby minimizing any incremental
burdens from dual reporting. The information
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requested is tailored narrowly to fit the enforcement
regime for which it is needed.
II.

Subpoena Power Cannot Substitute for
Schedule B Disclosure

Petitioners argue that, even if major-donor
information is relevant to charitable supervision, the
Schedule B reporting requirement is overbroad
because California has other means to obtain the same
information. Foundation Br. 31-32, 34-36; Law Center
Br. 38. Specifically, Petitioners suggest that California
could request donor information with respect to select
charities through subpoena or similar investigative
powers. Id.
This argument fails to understand the unique role
that mandatory annual reporting serves in charitable
oversight. The obligation to report donor information
each year, and in advance of any particular audit or
other enforcement action, offers several key
advantages over document requests initiated during
the investigative process.
A.

Major-Donor Information is Often
Necessary
to
Identify
Which
Organizations Should be Subject to
Investigation

Obtaining donor information by subpoena or other
document request would be an ineffective substitute
for Schedule B reporting, because donor information is
often needed before the Attorney General can even
open an investigation.
First, donor identity must frequently be
established before the Attorney General may even
assert jurisdiction. While the Attorney General has
jurisdiction to supervise charitable solicitation of
California residents, Cal. Bus. and Prof. Code
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§§ 17510-17510.95, this jurisdiction may be invoked
only if an organization’s donors are known and they
are confirmed to include Californians.
Next, major-donor information provides one of the
few efficient tools for identifying suspicious activity at
an organization. The California Attorney General
supervises more than 115,000 charities, Attorney
General’s Guide for Charities at 1, with a staff of
approximately a dozen full-time attorneys, Garry W.
Jenkins, Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the
Reform of Nonprofit State Law, 41 Ga. L. Rev. 1113,
1128 (2007); see State Regulation and Enforcement in
the Charitable Sector at 8 (reporting little change in
AG staffing in ten years following Jenkins survey).
Any practical enforcement strategy must enable the
Attorney General to readily identify transactions that
require more than minimal scrutiny. Matching
substantial contributors to other items on the tax
return, such as employees, contractors, and grantees,
can allow the regulator to focus on this narrower set of
potential red-flag transactions. AFPF JA 413-414;
AFPF C.A.E.R. 577-578, 716-718, 1062.
Donor information has been central to identifying
and remedying many major instances of improper selfdealing at charitable organizations. Credit-counseling
organizations provide a notable example. See
Profiteering in a Nonprofit Industry: Abusive
Practices in Credit Counseling, S. Rep. No. 109-55
(2005). These purportedly charitable entities were
intended to provide education to desperate debtors
and assist them in managing debt repayment plans.
Id. at 4-5. In fact, many instead served the interests of
creditors, to the detriment of the organizations’
supposed beneficiaries. Id. Creditors who stood to
benefit from “counseling” provided to beneficiaries
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proved to be major supporters of the most problematic
credit-counseling agencies, providing a key clue to
investigators. See California Department of
Corporations, Study of the Consumer Credit
Counseling
Industry
in
California
and
Recommendations to the Legislature Regarding the
Establishment of Fees for Debt Management Plans and
Debt Settlement Plans 5 n.12 (March 1, 2003) (defining
fair share payments and considering them to often be
kickbacks).
So-called “down-payment-assistance” organizations offer another important example. Sellers of
homes would contribute dollars to the down-paymentassistance “charity.” Those dollars would then be
granted to a low-income buyer, enabling the buyer to
make a 3% down payment to buy a home. States and
the IRS cracked down on these organizations after
they determined that they were more a scam to sell
homes and issue mortgages than an actual charitable
effort to put people in homes. See Rev. Rul. 2006-27,
2006-1 C.B. 915; Internal Revenue Service, Down
Payment Assistance Programs: Questions and Answers
(August 29, 2011). Again, the fact that large donors to
the organization directly benefited from their own
contributions was a central piece of evidence that
these organizations were not serving the public’s
interest. See Rev. Rul. 2006-27.
These examples about credit-counseling
agencies and down-payment-assistance organizations
illustrate but two of many ways in which Schedule B
aids in ferreting out improper activities. It does so as
well in numerous other situations, such as inflated
gifts-in-kind and loans disguised as donations. Resp.
Br. 7-8.
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B.

Annual Reporting
Deterrence

Contributes

to

In addition to assisting the Attorney General
directly,
the
substantial-contributor
reporting
requirement puts organizations on notice that the
Attorney General has the information necessary to
monitor possible self-dealing and excess benefit
transactions between the organization and its
principal donors. Awareness of such monitoring itself
deters organizations from engaging in such
transactions.
This role for reporting of information about major
donors is consistent with modern tax systems’
approach to information reporting generally. A tax
system could require taxpayers to report only
identifying information and their self-assessment of
their tax liabilities, with further details required only
from those taxpayers chosen for audit. But routine
submission of more comprehensive financial
information has key enforcement advantages. Tax
systems require broader information reporting on
annual returns because, when a taxpayer affirms that
the detailed information submitted is accurate, that
has both deterrence and liability implications. Henrik
J. Kleven et al., Why Can Modern Governments Tax So
Much? An Agency Model of Firms as Fiscal
Intermediaries, 83 Economica 219 (2016); see Jay A.
Soled, Homage to Information Returns, 27 Va. Tax
Rev. 371, 371-73 (2007) (“Most studies indicate that
such returns are pivotal in causing taxpayers to be
forthright in their reporting practices. These same
studies indicate that in the absence of such returns,
taxpayer compliance plummets.”); Margot L.
Crandall-Hollick & Conor F. Boyle, Cong. Rsch. Serv.,
R44993, Child and Dependent Care Tax Benefits: How
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They Work and Who Receives Them 13 (Feb. 1, 2021)
(noting that requiring tax-return reporting of
dependents’ social security number led to sharp
decline in number of dependents falsely claimed on
returns).
C.

Requesting Donor Information After an
Investigation Commences Is Less
Effective and Adds
Unnecessary
Burdens on Charities

Petitioners’ suggestion that the Attorney General
should instead rely upon California’s subpoena power
as a less intrusive alternative to confidential
mandatory reporting of the identity of substantial
contributors misapprehends the way in which charity
investigations are conducted. That suggestion, if
followed, would potentially expose filing organizations
to greater harm while undermining the Attorney
General’s ability to supervise charities effectively.
Information reporting is an important tool for
preliminary stage investigations because, contrary to
Petitioners’ apparent assumption, California is not
empowered to issue subpoenas to filers on a whim. The
State must be able to demonstrate a factual basis
showing that the information sought is “reasonably
relevant” to a matter within the Attorney General’s
authority or its subpoena may be quashed. People v.
West Coast Shows, Inc., 10 Cal. App. 3d 462, 470
(1970). Major-donor information, along with other
evidence, allows the state to develop a basis for
issuance of a subpoena. For example, identification of
major donors in Schedule B, combined with
information about transactions in which the
organization engaged with those same entities or
persons, would be critical evidence that could serve in
support of a subpoena. AFPF JA 402.
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Being forced to use subpoena power to obtain
major-donor information may also undermine the
success of well-founded investigations. Schedule B
information enables the State to assemble evidence of
solicitation fraud, illegal self-dealing, or other
violations of law without alerting a filer to the
pendency of the investigation. See SEC v. Jerry T.
O’Brien, Inc., 467 U.S. 735, 750-51 (1984) (explaining
policy rationales for keeping third-party information
requests confidential). For example, the State can
contact third-party sources in order to understand the
nature of transactions between the charity and major
donors. Demanding major-donor information from
filers in the preliminary stages of an inquiry would
invariably delay the course of an investigation and
might prompt the destruction of documents or other
evidence by the investigation’s target. Id. In cases of
fraud, for example, even brief delays can provide the
organization with opportunities to dispose of evidence,
manufacture further fraudulent evidence, or
otherwise cover up misdeeds. AFPF C.A.E.R. 590, 998990. Organizations may continue to misdirect assets
or exploit donors while the State awaits compliance
with its subpoena. AFPF C.A.E.R. 590, 998-990, 1029.
Use of Schedule B also diminishes unwarranted
burdens on charities. Screening with major-donor
information is likely to prevent at least some
investigations, as the State may conclude from
Schedule B information that substantial contributors
do not appear to be involved in transactions or
activities that are being examined. If the Attorney
General has available only the option of initiating an
investigation in the case of suspected violations
involving substantial donors, organizations with
Schedule B’s that would have assuaged concerns up
front will be subject to the disruption that a
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government investigation entails. State investigations, once opened, can take years to resolve. Attorney
General’s Guide for Charities at 85. Resolving
potential disputes at the pre-investigation stage thus
has the potential to greatly reduce the time and
resources an organization must devote to responding
to an investigation.
The burdens on charities that must respond to
subpoenas go beyond the cost of compliance with or
challenge to the subpoena; they include unnecessary
reputational harm to a charity should the issuance of
the subpoena become a public matter. Cf. Pollard v.
Roberts, 283 F. Supp. 248, 257 (E.D. Ark.), aff’d, 393
U.S. 14 (1968) (per curiam) (holding that state
subpoena for political party contributors burdened
recipients and was unconnected to any important
state interest). While investigation subpoenas are not
intended to be public, the secrecy of such a formal
demand on an organization with numerous employees
and other constituents cannot be presumed. For that
reason, Attorneys General resolve investigations
informally whenever possible, in an effort to avoid the
reputational damage that is associated with a public
government investigation. Attorney General’s Guide
for Charities at 85.
Finally, subpoenas can impose unnecessary
burdens on third parties. If the Attorney General
wishes to identify donors without alerting the
organization under investigation or suspects that
organization may not provide accurate information,
the Attorney General may request documents from
payment processors, outside fundraisers, or others
with relevant information. None of these requests, or
the time and expense necessary to fulfill them, would
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be needed if the information provided in the Schedule
B obviated the need for the requests.
III. Petitioners’ Views Would Threaten Central
Elements of Both State and Federal Charity
Reporting Regimes
Contrary to the suggestion of Petitioners,
Foundation Br. 45-47; Law Center Br. 53-55, and the
United States, U.S. Amicus Br. 24, if the Court were
to hold that California’s request for Schedule B is
unconstitutional, that holding could threaten many
other important elements of nonprofit oversight,
including federal law. The purposes that Schedule B
serves in California mirror those served by many other
reporting provisions, under both California and
federal law.
First, for many charities the Schedule B is not
reported confidentially to a government agency but is
a fully public document. Donors of $5,000 or more to
private foundations must be publicly disclosed. 7 26
U.S.C. § 6104(d)(1), (3)(A). Petitioner Americans for
Prosperity Foundation never mentions this fact, and
Thomas More mentions it only in passing. Law Center
Br. 7. Congress required public reporting of privatefoundation donors as a way of ensuring accountability
and preventing self-dealing at charities whose
activities would otherwise be difficult for the public to
observe. General Explanation of the Tax Reform Act of
1969 at 52-53.

For tax law purposes, all section 501(c)(3) organizations are
either public charities or private foundations. A private
foundation is defined (with certain exceptions) as one that draws
its support from a relatively small number of donors. 26 U.S.C. §
509(a). Petitioner Americans for Prosperity Foundation is not a
“private foundation” under this definition, despite its name.

7

29
Petitioners’ claims thus represent a direct
challenge to the federal regime for supervising private
foundations. Any supposed chilling effect on donors
that results from California’s confidential reporting
obligation seemingly would apply with even greater
force to federal public disclosure of Schedule B for
private foundations. A charity’s status as either a
public charity (confidential reporting of major donors
to the government) or a private foundation (public
disclosure of major donors) can turn on knife’s-edge
facts, such as whether the fraction of revenue derived
from sources other than substantial contributors
exceeds one-third of its revenues over the applicable
testing period, 26 U.S.C. § 509(a)(2)(A). It cannot be
the law that such a charity’s constitutional rights will
change from year to year as its revenue from these
sources ranges between thirty-two and thirty-four
percent.
Next, many other items currently reported and
publicly disclosed by charities could potentially reveal
information about private individuals, and so could
affect those individuals’ willingness to support or
associate with a given charity. As argued above, the
Form 990 lists key employees, board members,
contractors, and certain grantees. All of these parties
are essential to a charity’s ongoing mission. If public
disclosure in fact discouraged these individuals and
entities from associating with the charity, that effect
would threaten the charity’s operations more directly
than a small decrease in donor enthusiasm. And, like
major-donor information, each of these reporting
items could in theory be obtained via subpoena or
investigative demand rather than being reported
annually on a tax return.
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Further, and again similar to major-donor
information, information about key personnel and
transactions contributes importantly to the ability of
the Attorney General and the IRS to ensure that
charities comply with applicable law. Typically, no one
piece of information identifies prospective self-dealing.
AFPF JA 413. Instead, each piece contributes
incrementally to a picture that regulators can use to
identify potentially suspect transactions. See
Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 480 n.10 (1976)
(“Like a jigsaw puzzle, the whole ‘picture’ of
petitioner's false-pretense scheme with respect to Lot
13T could be shown only by placing in the proper place
the many pieces of evidence that, taken singly, would
show comparatively little.”). For example, if a major
donor also appears as a contractor to the organization,
and that donor’s close relatives serve as the
organization’s board members, the contracting
relationship will likely receive closer scrutiny than if
the Attorney General could observe any of those facts
only in isolation.
Thus, there is no ready way to distinguish
reporting of major-donor information from other
routine forms of information reporting. Data about an
organization’s activities, key supporters, and other
insiders form a web of information that supervisory
agencies use to draw inferences about which
organizations merit closer scrutiny. See AFPF JA 311.
If the Court accepts Petitioners’ arguments with
respect to one strand of that web, it could endanger the
other strands and result in the collapse or substantial
weakening of effective regulation of charities.
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The judgment of the court of appeals should be
affirmed.
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